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ABSTRACT:  In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor’s recent 
conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and 
in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. I 
argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to 
serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be 
reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theorytheory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, 
the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor’s original observation. 
Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily 
available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor’s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, Jerry Fodor (e.g. 1994, 1998, 2004) has argued that most theories of 
concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind are untenable. According 
to him, all of these theories violate one or more of what he calls the five ‘non-negotiable’ 
conditions. One difficulty with Fodor’s argument is that some of the five conditions he 
stipulates can be shown to be negotiable. Some philosophers, for example, have rejected 
the view that concepts must be compositional (e.g. Schiffer 1987). Still others have argued 
that an appeal to content similarity, as opposed to content identity, is sufficient to explain 
the publicity of concepts (e.g. Harman 1993). While I agree with the main thrust of Fodor’s 
conclusion, I argue that a simpler and more defensible case can be made for it, one that, 
contrary to Fodor’s argument, does not rest on problematic premises and is readily available 
from within the cognitive sciences. 
 
My approach takes as its point of departure the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts.1 This 
theory holds that conceptual structure should not, pace the ‘classical’ and prototype 
theories, or more generally, ‘similarity-based’ theories, be understood in terms of lists of 
properties but in terms of theories (naı¨ve or otherwise) that people hold. In the following, 
I will examine what it means to say that concepts are theories, or that they have a theoretical 
structure. In particular, I will review and assess two ways in which cognitive psychologists 
have interpreted the ‘theory-theory’, which for the sake of convenience, I will call 
the ‘literal’ and ‘liberal’ interpretations. My contention is that both interpretations lead to 
serious difficulties. The ‘literal’ approach is undermined by problems similar to those of prototype 
theories of concepts, problems to which it was originally intended to be a solution. 
The ‘liberal’ approach fares no better, for it yields an account of conceptual structure that 
exceeds the resources of cognitive economy. Furthermore, I will argue that there cannot be 
a third way in which to reformulate the ‘theory-theory’. As such, the problems generated by 
the ‘literal’ and ‘liberal’ approaches render the ‘theory-theory’ an untenable theory of concepts. 
I will conclude by examining some possible objections that may be raised to the critique 
presented here. 
 
Two caveats are in order. First, due to the constraint of space, the review of various 
psychological theories of concepts in the second section will not be a comprehensive one.2 
Its primary goals are simply to take note of some of the major problems that have plagued 
some of the earlier theories of concepts, and that have motivated and subsequently led to 
the adoption of the ‘theory-theory’. Second, the term ‘concept’ will be used here in the 
same sense as cognitive psychologists use it. This in no way implies that their usage is 
better but merely that it is in the domain of the cognitive sciences that our critique of 
the ‘theory-theory’ will take place. While the arguments presented below can be expanded 
for application to other uses of ‘concept’, this task can only be reserved for another 
occasion. 
 
 
Two Shifts in Conceptual Structure 
 
To cognitive psychologists, concepts are understood to be mental representations of 
categories, the ‘building blocks for human thought and behavior’ (Medin 1989, 1469). 
‘Category’ in this sense broadly refers to ‘a partitioning or class to which some assertion 
or set of assertions might apply’ (Medin 1989, 1469). Under this rather loose definition, 
the diversity of categories includes what some philosophers call ‘natural kinds’, such as 
gold and water, fictional entities such as ghosts and unicorns, and entirely arbitrary or 
ad hoc categories. For example, the substance gold constitutes a category because we 
can say of it (or its samples) that it, among other things, has the atomic number of 79. 
Also, the group of things consisting of a bubble gum wrapper, a computer, and a paper 
clip may count as a category because we can say of these things that they are physical 
objects that can be found on the desk in front of me. According to cognitive psychologists, 
in order for us to think, to reason or to learn about anything (or any category), we have to 
represent them in our minds. That is, we have to form concepts. A major concern of 
cognitive psychology is therefore to determine what kind of structure concepts possess. 
 
In his classic paper ‘Concepts and conceptual structure’, Douglas Medin (1989) 
observes that in the 20th century, there have occurred two radical shifts in the way cognitive 
psychologists have theorized about conceptual structure. The first shift occurred when 
prototype theories replaced the so-called ‘classical’ theory. In the ‘classical’ theory, a 
concept is construed as an abstract summary representation of the necessary and sufficient 
features or properties that all things subsumed under the concept must possess. For 
instance, the concept BACHELOR is a mental representation which embodies the defining 
properties ‘is male’, ‘is an adult’ and ‘is unmarried’.3 Whether or not something is to be 
categorized as a bachelor depends on whether it possesses these three requisite properties. 
If it does, then it is a bachelor; if not, then it is not. 
 
A serious difficulty with the ‘classical’ theory is the noticeable lack of bona fide definitions. 
As philosophers and psychologists have demonstrated, many concepts, especially 
ordinary, non-scientific ones, simply do not have clear-cut definitions (e.g. Fodor et al. 1981; 
Wittgenstein 1953). Evidently, if there are no definitions, then these concepts cannot have a 
definitional structure. Another objection to the ‘classical’ theory is raised by attention to the 
so-called ‘typicality effects’. Much of the research on categorization by Elenor Rosch and her 
colleagues (e.g. Rosch and Mervis 1975) suggests that people, contrary to what the ‘classical’ 
theory assumes, do not treat all members of a particular concept to be equally good 
examples. Instead, they look upon some members as more typical or ‘better’ than others 
and this disposition in turn shapes the way in which they categorize and reason. For 
example, people not only judge a sparrow to be a more typical example of a bird than a 
penguin, but they also categorize the former at a much faster rate. The pervasive influence 
of such ‘typicality effects’ has convinced some critics that the ‘classical’ theory is flawed in its 
account of conceptual structure that presumes that all members subsumed under a 
concept are of equal weight. 
 
Problems with the ‘classical’ theory caused the first shift in the theorizing about 
conceptual structure. An alternative approach developed in the 1970s to interpret category 
membership as ‘more graded and structured in terms of features that are only typical or 
characteristic of categories’ (Medin, Lynch, and Solomon 2000, 123–24). Like its ‘classical’ 
predecessor, this ‘probabilistic’ or prototype view holds that concepts are to be construed 
as lists of properties. Unlike the ‘classical’ theory, the prototype theory does not require 
these properties to be necessary and sufficient, but merely stereotypical among instances 
of a concept, where the typicality of a property is determined by the frequency with which 
it appears among instances of the concept. For example, for the concept BIRD, the property 
‘flies’ is considered more typical than the property ‘is white’, since more birds fly than birds 
that are white. Also, the prototype theory differs from the ‘classical’ in that the determination 
of whether an entity is subsumed under a concept depends on whether it satisfies 
a ‘sufficient’ number, or a ‘critical sum’, of stereotypical properties. Put differently, something 
is categorized under the concept if it is similar to the prototypical representation. 
For this reason, prototype theories are sometimes described as ‘similarity-based’ theories. 
 
Prototype theories are not, however, problem-free. Concepts in prototype theories 
recognize only the central tendency but not information about category size, the variability 
of the examples, and correlations and embedding relations among properties (Medin 1989, 
1472). An example given by Medin is the intuition that many people have of small birds 
being much more likely to sing than large birds. According to him, this intuition cannot 
be obtained from the prototype representation of BIRD because features encoded therein 
are treated as independent and additive. Thus, even though the prototype representation 
encodes both the properties ‘is small’ and ‘sings’, it does not identify any correlation 
between them.4 Since prototype representations leave out information to which, as experimental 
studies have shown, people are sensitive, and which they incorporate in their categorization 
tasks and other reasoning activities, Medin concludes that prototype theories 
provide at best an inadequate account of conceptual structure.5 
 
Another weakness of prototype theories is that the notion of similarity is too vague. It 
is too flexible and unconstrained for precise purposes. As mentioned, whether an entity is 
to be counted as a member depends on how similar it is to the prototype representation, 
where similarity is measured partly in terms of the number and kinds of properties 
members share. What properties are listed in the representation is therefore of critical 
importance for categorization, since different properties will lead to different categorizations. 
The problem with prototype theories is that they do not provide any explanations 
as to why certain properties are selected as part of the prototype representation. As Nelson 
Goodman (1972) has pointed out, there is in principle an infinite number of properties 
which two objects, however perceptibly dissimilar they are, can share. For example, a 
beach ball and a computer are both ‘not a whale’, ‘not a pair of scissors’, etc. Should the 
objects then, by virtue of sharing these trivial properties, be considered ‘similar’ and thus, 
subsumed under the same category? The answer, it would seem, hinges on the criteria of 
conceptual representation and the properties that they invoke. A theory of concepts must 
therefore be capable of explaining why certain properties are chosen to appear in the 
prototype representation. In simply compiling lists of such properties, prototype theories 
do not meet this requirement. 
 
 
 
‘Concepts Are More Than Lists’ 
 
The objections that I have considered so far all suggest that prototype theories are 
inadequate: they fail to incorporate information crucial for categorization and to explain 
why certain properties are selected under the prototype representation. In general, prototype 
theories are deficient in that they ‘seem to discard too much information that can be 
shown to be relevant to human categorization’ (Medin 1989, 1472). Such a problem, 
according to Medin, helped trigger the second shift, namely from similarity-based theories 
to ‘theory-based’ theories, or the ‘theory-theory’. 
 
How does the ‘theory-theory’ differ from similarity-based theories? As a starting 
point, Medin’s terse statement is instructive: ‘Concepts are more than lists [of properties]’ 
(Medin 1989, 1476). Such lists are, to be sure, useful but are insufficient in explaining conceptual 
structure. An adequate theory of conceptual structure must provide more than the 
listing of all the stereotypical properties shared by members of a concept. At a minimum, 
concepts must include the information which is ignored by prototype theories, namely 
information about category size, interproperty relations, member variability, and more generally, 
anything ‘that can be shown to be relevant to human categorization’. At a first 
approximation, then, concepts can be said to have a theoretical structure in that they 
encode lists of properties, and explanatory and underlying principles that account for 
the aforementioned deficiencies. Is this what cognitive psychologists mean when they 
claim that concepts have a theoretical structure? 
 
Here, we have to be cautious about what cognitive psychologists mean by the first 
occurrence of ‘theory’ in ‘theory-theory’. Different interpretations are at play. As Laurence 
and Margolis note, ‘there is considerable disagreement about how lenient one should be 
in construing a body of representations as a theory’ (1999, 44). Some employ the term in 
the sense of the natural sciences and demand that concepts possess the same characteristics 
as those of scientific theories. Others use it without stringent conditions and construe 
concepts in a more liberal fashion. Let us now consider in turn two approaches, which I 
label the ‘literal’ and ‘liberal’ interpretations. 
 
Cognitive psychologists of the ‘literal’ interpretation include Alison Gopnik, Andrew 
Meltzoff, and Henry Wellman. In ‘The theory theory’, Gopnik and Wellman (1994) identify 
three characteristics which they insist a theory must have. First, a theory must be abstract 
in the sense that it posits theoretical entities or constructs in order to provide causal explanations 
for the empirical phenomenon in question. An example is the atomic theory in 
chemistry, which posits protons and electrons in order to explain, among other things, 
why various chemical substances have the properties they do (e.g. boiling point, color, 
acidity, etc). Second, consequent upon the previous requirement, a theory must introduce 
a ‘different set of vocabulary’ specific to the subject matter under investigation (1994, 260). 
 
What Gopnik and Wellman mean by this is that prior to the formulation of a theory, the 
empirical phenomenon to be explained would have to be described in terms of an 
‘evidentiary’ vocabulary. Since a theory goes beyond the phenomenon by positing ‘hidden’ 
theoretical entities, it will need corresponding terms to refer to these entities. That is why 
theories must have a novel vocabulary. Lastly, the third characteristic is that a theory must 
be coherent in the following way: ‘The theoretical entities and terms postulated by a theory 
are closely, “lawfully”, interrelated with one another [and with the evidence]. As a result, 
changes in one part of a theory have consequences for other parts of the theory’ (1994, 
260–61). 
 
By virtue of these three characteristics, Gopnik andWellman claimthat a theory is able to 
provide explanations, interpretations and predictions of the empirical phenomenon in question. 
By the same token, anything lacking in any of these characteristics will not qualify as a 
theory. In fact, Gopnik and Wellman point out that empirical typologies and generalizations 
are not theories but are merely ‘orderings, partitionings, and glosses of evidence and experience 
[that] share the same basic vocabulary as the evidence itself’ (1994, 260–61). For 
example, in classifying plants, we may decide to put all plants with stems in one group, and 
those without in another. Within the group of stemmed plants, we may further divide them 
into sub-groups of over or under one-foot tall. This classification of plants will not count as a 
theory, by Gopnik and Wellman’s standards, since it is based solely on observable or evidential 
properties (e.g. we can see stems). Moreover, the resultant categories of sub-groups do not 
appeal at all to any theoretical constructs, and thus do not lead to any new vocabulary. 
 
This ‘literal’ view of theory stands in sharp contrast to the less rigorous, ‘liberal’ 
interpretation of theory proposed by Murphy and Medin. Here is what they say about 
the ‘theory-theory’:6 
 
When we argue that concepts are organized by theories, we use theory to mean any of a 
host of mental ‘explanations,’ rather than a complete, organized, scientific account. For 
example, causal knowledge certainly embodies a theory of certain phenomena; scripts 
may contain an implicit theory of the entailment relations between mundane events; 
knowledge of rules embodies a theory of the relations between rule constituents; and 
book-learned, scientific knowledge certainly contains theories. (1985, 426) 
 
The contrast to be drawn between this interpretation of theory and Gopnik and 
Wellman’s ‘literal’ approach is not one between a complete, organized scientific theory 
and an incomplete, unorganized one.7 While Gopnik and Wellman do impose strict 
conditions for what qualifies as a theory, they do not require theories to be complete. In 
fact, the very possibility that incomplete theories can undergo change is what partly motivated 
them to view conceptual change as analogous to changes in scientific theories. 
Moreover, to demand that people’s concepts embody complete scientific theories is 
implausible, for many people lack knowledge of such theories. 
 
In short, what qualifies as a theory for Murphy and Medin need not satisfy all three of 
Gopnik and Wellman’s stipulated conditions. To Murphy and Medin, something already 
counts as a theory if it provides ‘underlying principles’, such as ‘causal connections, script 
links, and explanatory relations’ (1985, 436), to explain any or all of the following: how concepts 
are internally structured, why certain properties are included in a conceptual representation, 
why some of these properties are correlated, and/or how concepts are related to one 
another. In their view, scripts and empirical typologies will count as a theory because they 
explain why certain things are categorized or grouped together as they are. The implication 
seems to be that insofar as a principle, generalization, or even a claim, performs any of the 
aforementioned explanatory functions, it is integral to conceptual representation. 
As to how much information a concept should represent, Murphy and Medin offer 
the following characterization: the theory-based approach ‘expands the boundaries of conceptual 
representation’ to include ‘all of the relations involving that concept and other concepts 
that depend on it’ (1985, 436). Only by doing so can theories embody knowledge 
about concepts and their use. This expansive treatment, however, leads to problems of 
its own. As we shall see, it is in its very attempt to be all-inclusive that Murphy and 
Medin’s ‘theory-theory’ encounters serious difficulties. 
 
 
Neither ‘Literal’ nor ‘Liberal’ 
 
In this section, I will argue that neither the ‘literal’ nor the ‘liberal’ interpretation is 
tenable. Moreover, I will show that there cannot be a third way in which to reformulate 
the ‘theory-theory’. I begin with the ‘literal’ interpretation. Recall that the central difficulty 
with prototype theories is that they ‘seem to discard too much information that can be 
shown to be relevant to human categorization’ (Medin 1989, 1472, quoted above). A prototype 
representation tends to abstract only the ‘central’ properties from instances of a 
concept and consequently, omit information which is relevant to the way people categorize, 
such as information regarding interproperty relations, variability of members, and 
category size. Such omissions are what led to the demise of the prototype theory and 
the adoption of the ‘theory-theory’. 
 
However, the ‘literal’ interpretation of the ‘theory-theory’ also fails to capture information 
relevant for categorization. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that James 
acquires the concept MOLD in his biology class and understands mold to be microscopic 
organisms composed of filaments called hyphae. By producing spores, hyphae can germinate 
to form a cottony mass called mycelium, commonly found in foods (e.g. bread) that 
have gone bad. Moreover, James finds out that hyphae not only can cause serious 
health problems such as skin allergies and blurry vision, but can also cause their hosts 
(e.g. woods or foods) to decay. By Gopnik and Wellman’s criteria, what James has 
learned about mold qualifies as a theory: it is abstract (the positing of ‘hidden’ theoretical 
entities such as filaments to explain colony mass), it has a new vocabulary (‘hyphae’ and 
‘filaments’), and it is coherent (e.g. the lawful relationship between hyphae and mycelium). 
 
Now, for the sake of argument, suppose also that James has a grandmother who, for 
whatever reason, always shrieks when and only when she sees mold. That is, her shrieking is 
reliably caused by the presence of mold (to make this situation more realistic, we may 
further assume that his grandmother used to be a micro-biologist who over the years 
has developed a keen eye for identifying mold but has yet to overcome her fear or 
disgust of it). Having repeatedly witnessed his grandmother’s shrieking upon seeing 
mold, and remembering no other times in which she has shrieked, James forms the 
belief, perhaps naturally so, that his grandmother shrieks when and only when mold is 
present. In this context, whether James’ belief is true is unimportant. What is important 
is that if James comes across some stuff in the future which causes his grandmother to 
shriek, he will automatically interpret her behavior in terms of his belief and judge that 
stuff to be mold. In fact, his belief may even be his sole basis for identifying mold, if, for 
instance, the stuff in question is a kind of mold he has never seen before.8 
 
What is crucial to note here is that James’ judgment constitutes an act of categorization. 
According to Smith and Medin, categorization is understood as the act of 
determining whether ‘a specific instance is a member of a concept’ (1981, 6). Similarly, 
categorization establishes ‘points of contact between previous situations and the current 
context’ (Medin 1989, 1469). Accordingly, James’ judgment counts as an instance of 
categorization because he is subsuming some new stuff (i.e. that which alarms his grandmother) 
under the concept MOLD. However, even though James appeals to his belief in 
categorizing instances of mold, his belief does not count as part of the scientific theory 
of mold which he has learned in his biology class. There are two reasons for this. First, 
his belief does not cohere (in Gopnik and Wellman’s sense) with the theory. For 
example, as far as James knows, there exist no ‘lawlike’ relationships between any theoretical 
constructs (e.g. hyphae) and his grandmother’s shrieks.9 As a result, there will be no 
consequences for the theory even if James ceases to believe that mold causes his grandmother 
to shriek. Second, this belief, qua an empirical generalization, does not import any 
new vocabulary into the theory, since it is couched purely in evidentiary terms (e.g. ‘grandmother’, 
‘shriek’, etc). As such, James’ belief, by Gopnik and Wellman’s standards, cannot 
be a part of the scientific theory. Nevertheless, his belief is vital and relevant for categorization: 
grandmother’s shrieking is a way in which James can identify mold. In short, James 
is appealing to some piece of information outside of the theory in order to categorize.10 
For this reason, the ‘literal’ interpretation of the ‘theory-theory’ faces the same problem 
as prototype theories: it fails to incorporate ‘information shown to be relevant for categorization 
purposes’. As such, it must also fail to provide an adequate account of 
conceptual structure for the same reason. 
 
Before proceeding, it is appropriate first to consider a possible objection. My argument, 
as it is presented, hinges on a twofold requirement. First, the presence of mold 
and James’ grandmother’s shrieks have to be correlated in a law-like fashion, or else 
James would not have formed the belief that his grandmother shrieks when and only 
when she sees mold. Second, law-like correlations involving observables (i.e. empirical generalizations) 
have to be taken as non-theoretical or else James would not have appealed to 
something outside of theory when he categorized mold. An objection might thus arise that 
the latter requirement is simply too restrictive, as it will disqualify many scientific laws from 
being considered theoretical. For instance, the geological law that rivers erode their banks, 
qua a law formulated entirely in terms of observables, cannot be regarded as theoretical. 
Since this requirement is overly restrictive, the objection continues, it should be abandoned, 
in which case empirical generalizations and law-like correlations will be accepted 
as theoretical. By the same token, James’ belief must also qualify as theoretical, and in 
appealing to it to categorize mold, he does not, in fact, step outside the bounds of 
theory. The ‘literal’ view may therefore be safe. 
 
In response, two aspects are pertinent. First, the idea that empirical generalizations 
do not qualify as theories stems from the view of Gopnik and Wellman that anything theoretical 
must satisfy the three criteria mentioned above. My criticism of their view is premised 
on a conditional: If theory is construed in this restrictive way, then any appeals to empirical 
generalizations in categorization would expose this formulation of the ‘literal’ view as 
inadequate, for it would fail to incorporate information relevant for categorization in 
much the same way as prototype theories. Second, I concede that law-like correlations 
should be regarded as theoretical. On the face of it, such a concession would seem to 
offer a way out of my earlier criticism, for theory is now expanded beyond Gopnik and 
Wellman’s three criteria to include empirical generalizations and other law-like correlations. 
11 Accordingly, James would no longer be going outside of theory when he 
appeals to his belief to categorize mold. 
 
This alternative formulation and defense of the ‘literal’ view, however, can also be 
shown to be deficient. This is because my criticism can be reformulated in such a way 
that it does not require a law-like correlation between the presence of mold and grandmother’s 
shrieks.12 The thought experiment can be so designed as to stipulate that 
James’ grandmother only sometimes shrieks at mold.13 For example, there are times 
when she sees mold but is too tired or otherwise preoccupied to shriek. Well aware of 
this, James forms the belief that his grandmother sometimes shriek at the sight of mold. 
Notice that James’ belief is not formed from empirical generalizations or any law-like correlation. 
From James’ perspective, whether his grandmother will shriek at mold or not 
depends entirely on contingent factors like her mood and her state of mind. Nonetheless, 
the next time James hears her shriek, he will still come to the conclusion that the stuff in 
front of his grandmother is mold.14 In such an event, he will still appeal to a belief 
outside of theory when he categorizes mold. Consequently, this alternative reformulation 
of the ‘literal’ view faces the same problem. 
 
The objection may still persist. If the ‘literal’ view is supposedly committed to the idea 
that a concept must include any relevant information for categorization, then why not 
simply include beliefs of the above kind as part of the theory? Thus, James’ peculiar 
belief about grandmother’s shrieks and mold will be incorporated into his theory of 
mold. With this, another version of the ‘literal’ view seems to be in the offing, one that 
satisfies Gopnik and Wellman’s three criteria, includes empirical generalizations and lawlike 
correlations, and contains any belief that is relevant for categorization. Is this third reformulation 
defensible? On scrutiny, it is not. The inclusion of such beliefs will inevitably inflate 
conceptual structure. A person can possess numerous beliefs about a particular kind 
of thing, most of which are relevant for his or her categorization purposes. To pursue the 
thought experiment, the array of James’ beliefs may include that mold is disgusting, that 
it is to be avoided and if found, eliminated, that it can be found in places like under 
the kitchen sink, that grandmother typically combats mold with a certain brand of disinfectant, 
that his friend Mary is not bothered by mold, and so on. All of these beliefs can be used 
by James (whether singly and jointly) to categorize mold. For example, he can infer that the 
substance in question is mold after hearing his grandmother describe it as disgusting 
and/or seeing her reach for the disinfectant.15 If these beliefs are incorporated into 
theory, conceptual structure under the ‘literal’ view will uncontrollably expand.16 
 
Consider another example. People often categorize birds by appealing to their 
stereotypical or superficial properties, all of which are plausibly included in their (naı¨ve) 
theories of birds. However, they can also do so by appealing to a myriad of other beliefs, 
many of which may be deemed trivial, accidental, or even false: that city birds are dirty, 
that some birds are scavengers, that birds are my friend John’s favorite creatures, that 
birds migrate south, that birds sometimes serve as a symbol of freedom in literature, 
that birds are signs of good or bad luck, and so on. Again, all of these beliefs can be 
used (either singly or jointly) to identify and categorize birds. To include all of these 
beliefs in theory would no doubt inflate the conceptual structure for birds endlessly. 
 
Two points merit attention here. My criticism of the ‘literal’ view, whether the original 
or derived versions, can be generalized beyond cases in which people have strange grandmothers. 
As the above examples show, it is quite a common occurrence for people to 
appeal to extra-theoretical beliefs when they categorize. This being the case, the ‘literal’ 
interpretation is just as defective as the prototype theories, which it is intended to 
replace. Also, if all of the beliefs relevant for identification and categorization are 
incorporated in a theory, then this modified ‘literal’ theory will incur problems of manageability, 
ones that are similar to those that plague the ‘liberal view’, to which our discussion 
will presently turn. 
 
The ‘liberal’ interpretation may at first glance offer an exit out of the difficulty faced by 
the above formulations of the ‘literal’ view. After all, its main criterion by which something 
can be judged to qualify as a theory, or some part thereof, is its ability to explain the aforementioned 
relations covered under a concept. James’ belief, insofar as it helps him categorize 
mold, will be incorporated as part of the theory in this interpretation. Problems 
nevertheless persist. Whereas the ‘literal’ construal of theory restricts the inclusion of information, 
the ‘liberal’ construal runs the risk of being excessively broad—so much so that it 
renders no useful account of conceptual structure. The latter offers an account of conceptual 
structure so generous that it turns out to be of very little practical use. For instance, it 
will have to include: (1) lists of properties, necessary, sufficient, and/or stereotypical; (2) all 
of the previously ignored information in ‘classical’ and prototype theories regarding 
interproperty relations, embedding relations, category sizes, and member variability; (3) 
empirical generalizations, scripts and typologies; (4) theoretical beliefs (‘theory’ in the 
‘literal’ sense); (5) extra-theoretical beliefs like James’ belief about his grandmother’s 
shrieks. Finally, it is obliged to take in (6) information that is trivial. To explain this, it is 
instructive to revisit, this time in full, an earlier excerpted quote from Murphy and Medin: 
 
In general, it can be seen that the similarity-based approach requires a minimum of 
conceptual organization and relations, whereas the theory-based approach emphasizes 
both. One way to describe this difference is to say that the theory-based approach 
expands the boundaries of conceptual representation: In order to characterize knowledge 
about and use of a concept, we must include all of the relations involving that concept 
and the other concepts that depend on it. To explain conceptual coherence, the processes 
that operate on a concept must be considered in addition to the information directly 
stored with it. (1985, 436) 
 
Something in this quote merits close attention. In order to characterize knowledge 
about a concept and its use, ‘all of the relations involving the concept and other concepts 
that depend on it’ (my italics) must be incorporated. This requirement seems somewhat 
extreme. Consider, again, the concept BACHELOR. It enters into relations with many things, 
the concepts of which depend on it. For example, it enters into relations with complex concepts 
of which it is a constituent part: BACHELORS WHO APPEAR ON TV REALITY SHOWS, BACHELORS 
WHO DON’T LIKE BREAD, BACHELORS WHO OWN BLACK CROWS. The list goes on ad infinitum. If 
Murphy and Medin are correct, then all of these relations must be represented under the 
conceptual structure of BACHELOR. 
 
The pressing question is: should all of the above information be represented under a 
concept? The answer is a resounding ‘no’. As Lloyd Komatsu points out, when theorizing 
about conceptual structure, it is important to keep in sight the trade-off between a concept’s 
economy and its informativeness: the more economical a concept is, the less informative 
it becomes, and vice versa. Accordingly, the ‘classical’ and the prototype theories are 
highly economical but uninformative, since they rely only on ‘a single representation [that] 
serves an entire category, representing all instances for all purposes’ (Komatsu 1992, 502). 
This representation will then be utilized to perform all sorts of cognitive tasks, such as 
planning, combining concepts, and making inferences. However, since only the central 
properties (namely, the definitional and the stereotypical) are represented, concepts in 
such theories suffer ‘a loss in the amount of detail’ that they can transmit (Komatsu 1992, 
502). In contrast, ‘theory-based’ theories are highly informative but not very economical. 
The concepts that they denote are multiplex in nature; even ‘a single word or mental 
category implies multiple representations’ (Komatsu 1992, 502).17 Since these multiple 
representations will be accessed each time the concept is tokened, the heavy burden on 
cognitive economy will be unbearable. 
 
It should be clear from the above discussion that the problem with the ‘liberal’ 
interpretation of the ‘theory-theory’ is that if conceptual representation is supposed to 
include ‘all of the relations involving the concept and the other concepts that depend on 
it’, plus the information omitted by prototype theories (e.g. interrelation among properties, 
embedding relations, variability of members), then concepts will not be economical at all; all 
of the above information will have to be accessed every time the concept is used. This in turn 
will generate significant problems at the computational level and unduly tax the cognitive 
resources, such as working memory and processing capacities.18 Furthermore, according 
to Komatsu, it will also raise issues related to the ‘frame’ problems and knowledge access 
prevalent in the field of artificial intelligence (1992, 516). In brief, any account of conceptual 
structure that results in mental exhaustion cannot be a viable option. 
 
To conclude this section, it suffices to explore briefly whether there is a third way in 
which the ‘theory-theory’ can be reformulated such that it can steer clear of the foregoing 
problems. Let us start by considering what this third interpretation should look like. From 
the preceding discussion, it is clear that conceptual structure should embody more than 
what the ‘literal’ interpretation (i.e. Gopnik and Wellman’s) permits but less than what 
the ‘liberal’ interpretation allows. It would appear that the third alternative will be situated 
somewhere between these two and as a corrective, will comprise only some of the relations 
stipulated by Murphy and Medin. The issue thus boils down to deciding which parts of 
the conceptual structure under the ‘liberal’ interpretation to keep and which parts to 
exclude. However, this is not exactly feasible, for all of the information included under the 
‘liberal’ interpretation is assumed to be relevant to categorization. Again, as I have stressed 
above, this assumption served as the primary motivation behind the adoption of the 
‘theory-theory’. If any such information is to be omitted, this refurbished interpretation 
of the ‘theory-theory’ will backtrack to the beaten path of the prototype and the ‘literal’ 
interpretation in discarding information needed for categorization. 
 
Notice that such a middle-ground position of the ‘theory-theory’ may well be filled by 
the two modified reformulations of the ‘literal’ view which I have examined above. Both 
acknowledge the inadequacy of Gopnik and Wellman’s overly restrictive construal of 
theory and try to rectify it by incorporating empirical generalizations and/or beliefs into 
the conceptual structure. Each, however, as explained, turns out to be problematic. One 
fails to include beliefs relevant for categorization, while the other generates an unwieldy 
problem of inclusivity, one that is similar to that of the ‘liberal’ view. Other attempts to 
arrive at a middle-ground position will likewise fail. For instance, Jesse Prinz suggests 
that ‘a natural proposal for distinguishing theoretical beliefs from other beliefs [is to] say 
that theories include just beliefs about ontological category membership, essence, and 
explanatory structure’ (2002, 87). Thus, Medin and Ortony’s psychological essentialism 
(1989) postulates that people believe that things subsumed under a single category 
share a common set of essential properties (or an ‘essence’) and that these properties 
play a crucial role in explanations (e.g. category membership) and in the performance of 
cognitive tasks such as categorization. In this light, theoretical beliefs are limited to 
those concerned with such properties, including what Medin and Ortony have called 
‘essence placeholders’. Similarly, Keil (1989) demarcates conceptual structure by emphasizing 
information that is relevant for explaining causal relations and structures as they pertain 
to ontological matters. For our purposes, there is no need to explore these theories in 
detail. Suffice it to note that any such attempts to delimit theory will result in the omission 
of some non-theoretical information that is relevant for categorization, like accidental 
properties and mistaken beliefs.19 For instance, James’ belief that mold is disgusting is 
neither related to the ‘essence’ of mold nor to its ontological status. To conclude, there 
cannot be a third way in which to reformulate the ‘theory-theory’. The problems with 
the ‘literal’ and ‘liberal’ approaches, as well as the exhaustion of options, pose serious 
difficulties for the ‘theory-theory’, making it a problematic view of concepts.20 
 
 
Objections and Implications 
 
One way in which advocates of the ‘liberal’ interpretation of the ‘theory-theory’ can 
respond to the above objection that its permissive account of conceptual structure violates 
cognitive economy is to reject the assumption that all the information included under the 
conceptual representation is accessed every time the concept is used. Instead, they canmaintain 
that only a subset of such information will be accessed each time the thinker employs the 
concept. Whichever subset will be involved depends on the specific cognitive task at hand 
and on its immediate context. As Solomon et al. (1999) point out, experimental studies 
have shown that the kind of information represented under a concept and thus, available 
to the thinker, varies with the kind of cognitive task he has to perform, be it categorization, 
communication, planning, or conceptual combination. In other words, a concept can have 
multiple representations, each of which corresponds to a specific context and cognitive 
task. For instance, for the concept ELM, a person may have access to information about 
the aesthetic properties of elm trees if he has a landscaping project in mind. In contrast, he 
may have access to the trees’ biological and chemical properties, if he is engaged in a different 
cognitive task, such as preparing for a botany exam. Moreover, the information available in 
one context need not be made available in others. In this case, information regarding the 
molecular make-up of elm trees will typically not be accessed by the landscaper, whose 
main concern is to select the best way to arrange his elm trees in his garden. 
 
Theory-theorists can therefore overcome the cognitive economy objection by 
arguing that since only a subset of information will be retrieved for the performance of 
each specific cognitive task, there will no longer be any economy problems pertaining to 
memory and computational capacities. Unfortunately, this response will not do. Even if 
this defense neutralizes the initial objection, it gives rise to a fresh problem. The key idea 
behind the theory-theorists’ response is that a concept can have multiple representations 
associated with it in the sense that different information can be represented under 
different cognitive tasks. Notice, however, that each of these representations is supposed 
to correspond or belong to the same concept. Returning to our above example, the 
information regarding the chemical and biological properties, and the information 
regarding the superficial properties, are both supposed to be of elm trees. The question 
here for the theory-theorist is: by virtue of what are these various representations representations 
belonging or corresponding to the same concept? Put another way, if a concept 
can have different representations associated with it, what ensures that all of these 
representations are of the same concept? 
 
The ‘liberal’ theory-theorists may be tempted to claim that there is some common 
element or intrinsic structure that different representations possess such that it makes 
them correspond to the same concept. In the case of ELM, they may claim that the representations 
corresponding to the landscaping task and the exam-writing task may both include a 
commonminimal structure such that itmakes both of themrepresentations of elmtrees. Such 
a structuremay be considered a ‘core’ part of the concept ELM which is directly responsible for 
making them both representations of elms. However, this response is clearly not an open 
option to theory-theorists. In light of our review of the ‘classical’ and prototype theories 
above, any such attempt to carve out a minimal structure or core part has failed: such a 
minimal structure will always turn out to be insufficient for the concept, as it will omit information 
which is relevant for categorization.21 These are precisely the drawbacks of prevailing 
theories which the ‘theory-theory’ is formulated to address in the first place.22 
 
In short, the ‘liberal’ interpretation cannot overcome the cognitive economy 
problem. Given that the ‘literal’ interpretation of the ‘theory-theory’ also has its share of 
problems, and that we have shown that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in 
which we can construe the ‘theory-theory’, it is clear that the ‘theory-theory’ is an untenable 
theory of concepts. 
 
What implications does this critique against the ‘theory-theory’ have with respect to 
theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind? I suggested 
earlier that this argument can be used to support Fodor’s conclusion that most theories of 
concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind are untenable. The extent 
to which it does so depends on how one views the status of the ‘theory-theory’. If one 
accepts Medin’s point that the ‘theory-theory’ is supposed to replace the prototype 
theory, and that the prototype theory is in turn supposed to replace the ‘classical’ theory, 
a harsh verdict follows: since the ‘theory-theory’, the latest major solution, is misguided, 
the cognitive sciences do not have a working theory of concepts. If, on the other hand, 
one concedes that prototype and/or ‘classical’ theories can be rehabilitated with their problems 
exposed by theory-theorists corrected, a more lenient verdict will ensue: at least the 
‘theory-theory’ is out of the race. In this case, further arguments will be needed to dislodge 
these revived theories. 
 
There is reason to think that the harsh verdict follows. Attempts to salvage the ‘classical’ 
and prototype theories have geared mostly towards bridging gaps so that previously 
ignored information relevant to categorization tasks and reasoning will be admitted. Some, 
for instance, have argued that the prototype theory may be adjusted to explain correlations 
among properties by positing ‘labeling’ relations or by combining the correlated properties 
into a conjunctive one (Smith and Medin 1981). Other efforts at improved revisions also aim 
to overcome the initial limitations by expanding their scope to incorporate whatever information 
that critics deem essential. However, as argued above, the problem is a far deeper 
one. A shared assumption among cognitive scientists insists that concepts must embody all 
information relevant to categorization. Yet, since there is no definite or cut-and-dry way of 
determining exactly what or what not to include, the tendency has been to expand coverage 
as far as possible in order to secure the conceptual structure. Concepts are supposed to 
encode all that is, or appears, relevant to categorization. Sooner or later, and already in the 
case of ‘liberal’ theory-theorists, the inevitable outcome is one of straining cognitive 
economy. Thus, the harsh verdict seems more pertinent. 
 
I also indicated earlier that this critique of the ‘theory-theory’ is much stronger than 
the arguments advanced by Fodor against psychological theories of concepts. Fodor’s 
arguments all revolve around what he calls the five ‘non-negotiable’ conditions: (1) concepts 
are mental particulars; (2) concepts compose; (3) many concepts are learned; (4) 
concepts are public; and (5) concepts are categories (1998). According to Fodor, any 
adequate theory of concepts must meet these five conditions. However, as he notes, the 
‘classical’, the prototype and the ‘theory-theory’ approaches all fail to do so. For instance, 
prototype theories violate the compositionality constraint, and thus cannot account for 
how human thought can be both productive and systematic. Similarly, the ‘theorytheory’, 
committed as it is to holism, the view that the content of a concept is individuated 
by the thinker’s complete set of beliefs, violates the publicity constraint. Consequently, 
Fodor concludes that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive 
sciences and in the philosophy of mind. 
 
However, Fodor’s five conditions have invited criticisms over the years. Philosophers 
and psychologists have questioned, in some context or other, whether such conditions are 
really non-negotiable. For example, not all philosophers agree that compositionality is 
required to explain the productivity and systematicity of thoughts (e.g. Schiffer 1987). 
Clearly, if compositionality is not required, then prototype theories could still be in the 
running as a viable interpretation. Also, some of the specified conditions seem to be 
tailored to suit Fodor’s need to argue his own theory of concepts (Informational 
Atomism) and his Representational Theory of Mind (RTM). Thus, if one does not accept 
his RTM, there is no reason why one must consider the ontological status of concepts in 
terms of mental particulars and not in terms of epistemic capacities. In contrast, notice 
that my critique of the ‘theory-theory’ makes no explicit use of Fodor’s five conditions. 
It appeals only to internal elements of cognitive psychology and does not rely on any 
controversial philosophical assumptions. As such, it is purely an internal critique, and 
avoids the vulnerabilities of Fodor’s arguments. 
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NOTES 
 
1. The ‘theory-theory’ is also sometimes referred to as a ‘theory-based’ or ‘explanation-based’ 
theory of concepts. It is important to distinguish this sense of ‘theory-theory’ from what 
some philosophers, such as Nichols and Stich (2003), have also labeled as the ‘theorytheory’, 
which primarily relates to self-awareness. 
 
2. For a detailed overview of these theories, see Komatsu (1992), Laurence and Margolis 
(1999), Medin (1989), Murphy (2002), and Smith and Medin (1981). 
 
3. Concepts will be denoted by SMALL CAPITALS. 
 
4. To see this, consider the following: For the concept BIRD, the following stereotypical properties 
may be represented under the prototype: ‘flies’, ‘sings’, ‘is brown’, ‘has a beak’, ‘is 
small,’ ‘has webbed feet’, etc. If correlations among properties can be represented simply 
by virtue of listing each of the correlated properties in the representation, then many correlations 
will result: small birds tend to sing, small birds tend to be brown, brown birds tend to 
sing, flying birds tend to sing, etc. However, many of these correlations are clearly false. 
Thus, representing correlations among properties requires something more than the mere 
listing of properties. 
 
5. For instance, recent evidence from developmental psychology has shown that children’s 
concepts turn out to be rather complex. Many of their concepts contain information about 
ontology, functions, causation, intentions, and ‘hidden’ and ‘non-obvious’ properties (such 
as an organism’s innards or an object’s ‘essence’), to which children appeal when they categorize 
(Carey 1985; Gelman and Koenig 2003; Gelman and Wellman 1998; Keil 1989; 
Medin and Ortony 1989). 
 
6. Murphy and Medin explicitly state that they are not proposing a new model of conceptual 
representation (1985, 426). Our purpose here is merely to summarize what they mean by 
theory in order to arrive at a manageable construal of the ‘theory-theory’. 
 
7. Another contrast that can be drawn here is that Murphy and Medin are primarily interested 
in adult concepts, whereas Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Wellman are mainly concerned 
with concepts held by children. This contrast, however, is of minor importance in the 
context of our current discussion because our central purpose is merely to come up 
with possible ways in which to construe the ‘theory-theory’. 
 
8. In what follows, I will assume that grandmother’s shrieks serve as the only way in which 
James identifies mold. Of course, there will be occasions in which her shrieks will serve as 
additional evidence for identifying mold and still others, in which they do not come into 
play. Notice that it does not matter much to the argument just which role grandmother’s 
shrieks play. So long as James’ belief about grandmother’s shrieks can be used on 
occasion to categorize mold, it would have to be included as part of the conceptual structure. 
After all, critics of prototype theories have insisted that correlations be included as 
part of the concept even though such relations only sometimes play a role in categorization. 
Moreover, features listed under a prototype do not always factor in the performance 
of categorization tasks; that is why they are probabilistic. 
 
9. It may be tempting to refer to the reliable relationship between mold and grandmother’s 
shrieking as a ‘lawlike’ relationship. However, recall that Gopnik and Wellman intend such 
relationships to involve a theoretical construct or term. Since the relationship between 
mold and grandmother’s shrieking only pertains to observable phenomena, it is best 
described as an empirical generalization. Also, it is possible that there could be a lawlike 
relationship which exists between hyphae and his grandmother’s shrieks. However, as 
far as James knows, this is not something entailed by his theory of mold. As such, his 
belief must be considered outside of theory. 
 
10. Some may object that my notion of categorization is not the same as that employed by 
cognitive psychologists. For instance, their notion pertains to spontaneous, quick, or ‘intuitive’ 
acts of subsuming things under a category, whereas mine concerns a much broader 
phenomenon, including categorization which results from deliberation or inferences. In 
response, I point out that there is no reason to think that James’ categorization judgments 
involving his belief about his grandmother’s shrieks cannot be of the spontaneous or the 
intuitive kind; in fact, James’ belief may have been an implicit one all along, never enjoying 
a moment of conscious reflection. Moreover, it has become ‘second nature’ for him to 
associate grandmother’s cries with mold. If this is true, then my argument against the 
‘literal’ interpretation holds: he would still be appealing to something outside of theory 
to categorize (in the same sense of categorization employed by cognitive psychologists). 
 
11. For example, Keil (1989), Murphy and Medin (1989), and Rips (1989) have suggested 
formulations of theory that incorporate, among other things, empirical generalizations. 
 
 
12. Incidentally, this avoids another objection: an empirical generalization could still be 
regarded as theoretical because the requirement for theory is not that the generalization 
itself has to satisfy the three criteria set forth by Gopnik and Wellman, but that the overall 
theory, of which the generalization is a part, satisfies them. Thus, the empirical generalization 
could be incorporated under theory solely on the basis of it being a law-like correlation. 
In my view, this objection fails because my reformulated thought experiment no 
longer relies on such a correlation. 
 
13. Here is another way in which the thought experiment can be modified. Suppose that 
James has witnessed only one occasion in which grandmother shrieked at the presence 
of mold. However, it was such a memorable and vivid experience (e.g. he has never 
seen his grandmother shriek like that before) that there is a strong association in his 
mind between her shrieks and the presence of mold. So, the next time he hears her 
scream in a similar fashion, he cannot help but to think that she is in the presence of mold. 
 
14. There are two points to note here. First, as with the original thought experiment, whether 
or not James is correct to arrive at this conclusion is not important; he is perfectly willing 
to acknowledge the fallibility of his belief. Second, that the belief itself is based on a probabilistic 
relationship between shrieks and mold should not disqualify it from being used 
for categorization. After all, prototype theories made use of features and properties 
that were probabilistic. 
 
15. At this point, one could object that in such cases, James would not be categorizing mold; 
instead, he would merely be appealing to these beliefs to identify it. However, it is unclear 
whether the ‘literal’ view is committed to the idea that a concept must include all information 
that might be relevant for identifying its members. If it is not, then it could not 
be faulted for excluding information pertinent to identification. In response, I would 
like to point out that identification is (a type of) categorization: to identify x as y is 
simply to apply the concept Y to x. It is unclear how a person can be said to identify something 
as mold if she had not already applied the concept MOLD to the entity appearing 
before her. If this is correct, then the ‘literal’ view would be committed to the idea that 
a concept has to include any information relevant for identifying its members, for it is 
already committed to the idea that a concept has to include information relevant for categorization. 
As we have already seen, this latter commitment was a primary motivation 
behind the adoption of the ‘theory-theory’. 
 
16. For instance, this construal of the ‘literal’ view not only would encompass items (1)–(5) 
(see the discussion on the ‘liberal’ view’s account of conceptual structure in the third paragraph 
below in the text), but also some ‘trivial’ information (provided that it is relevant for 
categorization purposes). 
 
17. Just how much information conceptual structure will need depends, of course, on the 
theory itself (whether the ‘liberal’ or ‘literal’ interpretation). 
 
18. For instance, Prinz argues that if concepts were construed as ‘long-term-memory 
networks’, then they could not be activated by our finite and limited working memory 
(2002, chaps 4, 6). 
 
19. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the only way to ensure that all such information 
would be included in the theory is to subscribe to the ‘liberal’ view. 
 
20. I have hitherto been assuming that the ‘theory-theory’ is a theory of conceptual structure 
which holds for all kinds of concepts. Thus, the argument presented here shows, at the 
very least, that there are certain concepts of which the ‘theory-theory’ cannot be true, 
and therefore, that the ‘theory-theory’ is untenable. Not all psychologists, however, 
make this assumption about the ‘theory-theory’. For instance, Gopnik and Nazzi hold that 
the ‘theory-theory’ ‘does not seem to be as naturally applicable to other types of knowledge, 
for example, purely spatial knowledge, syntactic or phonological knowledge, 
musical knowledge or mathematical knowledge’ (2003, 307). Instead, they (along with 
other cognitive psychologists) maintain that the ‘theory-theory’ holds at least for 
natural object concepts, concepts like FISH, GRASS, SKUNK, etc. The important point to 
note here is that our critique of the ‘theory-theory’ can still be applied to such concepts. 
 
21. It is worth emphasizing that it is not my requirement that concepts should embody all 
information that is relevant for categorization. As I have noted, this requirement was 
set forth by cognitive psychologists when they abandoned similarity-based theories in 
favor of the ‘theory-theory’. My point is that such a requirement would rule out the possibility 
of a theory that posits a minimal structure (see Note 22). 
 
22. We may, of course, want to devise a criterion other than categorization for what to include 
under conceptual structure. However, adopting this path will essentially undermine the 
rationale for subscribing to the ‘theory-theory’. 
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